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EU     European Union 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The growing of crops, for example wheat, is relatively easy to regulate. The farmer owns a 
certain area of land and is, tenant farming excluded, owner of the wheat on that land as 
well. Moreover, the wheat does not move and stays at the same place from sowing to 
harvesting. Notwithstanding the fact that agriculture and fisheries are mentioned in the 
same phrase in most cases, regulating fisheries is a totally different issue. Fishermen do not 
own a certain piece of sea, are not the owners of a certain stock of fish and fish stocks can 
be highly migratory. Nevertheless, a few initiatives have seen the light in relation to the 
governance of the fishing industry to prevent a “tragedy of the commons”.1 
In the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention), the 
State Parties “will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and the oceans, the equitable and 
efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the 
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment”.2 In case of internal waters, 
the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), it is in general relatively easy to 
provide and enforce rules because the coastal State has a particular degree of jurisdiction. 
Concerning the high seas, only the five articles in the second section of Part VII specify a 
little about fishing in these areas. Part XII of the 1982 LOS Convention provides some 
basis for protection and preservation of the marine environment. Section 6 of Part XII is 
dedicated to enforcement of this regulation of the marine environment, dividing the 
obligations among different kinds of pollution and States in different capacities. The 1995 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) adds 
more detail to the 1982 LOS Convention with regard to fisheries law and an important role 
for flag States, port States and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). 
Quintessential to note is that the freedom of the high seas – in casu everyone’s right 
to fish on the high seas – is no longer absolute.3 The idea of the freedom of the high seas is 
based on the 17th century assumption that ocean resources are endless. Nowadays, 
                                                        
1 G. Hardin. ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. 1968 Science, pp. 1243-1248. 
2 1982 LOS Convention, preamble. 
3 K.M. Gjerde. ‘High Seas Fisheries Management under the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in D. 
Freestone, R. Barnes and D.M. Ong (eds.). The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects. Oxford (Oxford 
University Press) 2006, pp. 281-307, p. 304. 
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however, it forms one of the basic problems for ocean fisheries.4 Notwithstanding this 
claim, Grotius already acknowledged that fishing might be prohibited when it is proven 
that the resources are exhaustible.5 Undoubtedly, measures are needed. And current 
international fisheries law acknowledges this necessity.6  
Particular characteristics of the fishing industry are also troublesome when it comes 
to regulation. There is no incentive for an individual fisherman to reduce his or her catch at 
a certain point in time with the objective to catch more later on. Namely, a stock of fish 
needs time to recover and is subject to the risk of collapse if this possibility is not 
provided. However, most of the fisherman’s colleagues will not hesitate to take this risk. 
For this reason, long-term objectives are close to non-existent in the fisheries industry 
without governmental regulation.7 The same economic analysis of this tragedy-of-the-
commons example is valuable at the level of States. A flag State has no incentive to 
regulate the industry, let alone reduce its total allowable catch (TAC) voluntarily, if other 
flag States with vessels fishing in the same area are not likely to do the same.8 These 
vessels would then simply catch what the others will not. 
Moreover, fishermen see themselves as attributing directly to the economy’s most 
important part in their region.9 It can be very difficult to find alternative employment in 
coastal areas, making the fishing industry a very sensitive political issue.10 This feature 
gives the political parties in government an opportunity to simply ‘buy’ votes by 
subsidising the fishing industry. Evidently, this characteristic results in a negative effect on 
the objective to eradicate overfishing; it is only a stimulation to fish more. Consequently, a 
race for fish arises. Normally, such a race means that fishermen try to reach the quota as 
                                                        
4 Ibid., p. 303. 
5 H. Grotius, Mare liberum sive de iure quod Batavis competit ad indicana commercia. Dissertatio 
(translated by R. van Deman Magoffin). Union, New Jersey (Lawbook Exchange) 2001, p. 43. 
6 See Gjerde (2006) note 3 supra. 
7 P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell. International Law & the Environment. 3rd edition. Oxford (Oxford 
University Press) 2009, p. 705 and see note 1 supra. 
8 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea. 3rd edition. Manchester (Manchester University Press) 
1999, p. 286. 
9 C. Lequesne. ‘Quota Hopping: The Common Fisheries Policy Between States and Markets’. 2000 Journal 
of Common Market Studies no. 5, pp. 779–793, pp. 781-783. 
10 E. da Conceição-Heldt. ‘‘Taking Actors’ Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: the EU 
Common Fisheries Policy.’ 2006 Journal of Public Policy no. 3, pp. 279-299, p. 290. 
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quickly as this quota is determined.11 Furthermore, criminal organisations make their way 
into the fisheries industry.12 
Classification societies may provide part of the solutions to the above-described 
difficulties. These societies have their origin in the world of shipping and are currently 
active mostly in this field. The regulatory system that serves the shipping industry – 
maritime law13 – has a considerable national component. Taking into account the fact that 
every State in the world has the right to establish a fleet,14 approximately two hundred 
legal systems regulating national fleets are potentially in existence. To maintain a general 
scope, this thesis will focus on the possibilities for classification societies from an 
international viewpoint. This choice points directly towards the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and the international instruments that are developed under its 
guidance. 
Virtually none of these IMO instruments are applicable to fishing vessels.15 
Unfortunately, the ones that could be relevant for fishing vessels are either not in force 
(yet) or beyond the functional scope of classification societies. Until recently, classification 
societies did not focus primarily on the manner in which the crew operates the vessel – 
developments concerning the International Safety Management Code might provide an 
exception - neither did they pay attention to manning itself. Any reference to the work of 
the International Labour Organization was therefore difficult to apply to classification 
societies. As a consequence, searching for provisions in international legal instruments that 
could offer the foundation for applying tasks of classification societies to fishing vessels in 
order to improve flag State performance is similar to looking for a needle in a haystack. 
Arguably, this approach is not the most suitable way forward.  
The reason for the exclusion of fishing vessels in most cases seems to be a simple 
lack of competence of maritime administrations over fishing vessels.16 This characteristic 
                                                        
11 R. Hilborn et al. ‘States of the world fisheries’ 2003 Annual Review of Environmental Resources, pp. 15.1-
15.40. 
12 General Assembly of the UN. Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, and related instruments (A/RES/65/38), Para. 56. 
13 For the sake of clarity in this thesis, maritime law is regarded as operating in the national private law sector 
dealing mainly with contracts, as insurances, for example. On the contrary, law of the sea is a part of 
international law and therewith public law to a large extent. 
14 This right is highly relevant for landlocked States. 
15 1977 International Convention of the Safety of Fishing Vessels, preamble. 
16 J. Fitzpatrick. ‘Measures to enhance the capability of a flag State to exercise effective control over a 
fishing vessel’ in FAO. Report of and papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported 
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makes it unlikely that international legal instruments will include provisions that could be 
relevant for fishing vessels in the near future. Therefore, it is considered wise to start with 
a blank sheet and develop a potential basis for classification activities in fisheries around 
the globe from the scratch.17 Following this approach, however, does not mean that the 
IMO is not willing to deal with fishing vessels. The special value of port State control in 
the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) is noticeable in 
this regard.18 
In close connection with these issues, the problems with flags of non-compliance 
and flags of convenience need to be described. These can include, for example, the 
willingness and ability to comply, external private institutions that exercise public 
functions and temporal problems as lagging behind in implementing policies. Less 
attention will be paid to the separate jurisdiction of States; the emphasis will be on 
cooperation between States. Special attention has to be paid, though, to general 
international rules for RFMOs, also taking into account their non-contracting parties. Next 
to existing law, expert advices and draft regulations deserve some attention. The discussion 
of these documents will lead to the conclusion that existing legislation and proposed rules 
are of considerable significance. 
All the above leads to the main question to be answered, which is what could be the 
potential role of classification societies in improving flag State performance in marine 
capture fisheries. First of all, the basic obligations in international fisheries law are set out. 
Secondly, an elaboration on flag State jurisdiction and its significance today will follow. 
Thirdly, an outline of the current work of classification societies introduces the key 
developments in the maritime field. Fourthly, the differences between examining a vessel 
and assessing a whole flag State come to surface and both the legal and practical issues 
linked to that are explained. Connected risks also deserve attention, as does the possible 
progressive development of the law. Finally, a conclusion tries to bind the loose ends 
together. In order to exercise the research, the widest range possible of all forms of hard 
law, soft law, cases, documents, reports, books and articles was assessed.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
and Unregulated Fishing (Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 2000) FAO Fisheries Report no. 666. Rome (FAO) 
2001, Executive Summary. 
17 Ibid., Para. 42. 
18 Sub-Committee of the International Maritime Organisation on Flag State Implementation (Note by the 
Secretariat). Outcome of the fourth IMO Workshop for PSC MoU/Agreement Secretaries and Directors of 
Information Centres. 11 February 2009. FSI 17/7/1, Annex, Para. 19. 
  8 
The idea for this application of classification societies originates with the 
Norwegian government. The bridge that it builds between law of the sea and the maritime 
field makes the subject highly topical. The present thesis tries to provide a fairly new and 
creative solution to the problem of flag State performance. The text merely demonstrates 
the potential basis for any further development both in a practical and legal way. The 
novelty of the topic goes hand in hand with caveat that the present document does 
potentially not include all the possible insights. However, the most comprehensive 
coverage is pursued. 
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Chapter 2 Basic obligations of international fisheries law 
 
The specific properties of the fishing community ask for governmental intervention, as is 
indicated above. However, unilateral measures by flag States could contribute heavily to 
the elimination of overfishing - in other words the conservation of fish stocks – but 
cooperation with other States is necessary.19 Fortunately, the drafters of the 1982 LOS 
Convention recognised this difficulty. The 1982 LOS Convention encourages cooperation 
between coastal States, flag States, other States and possible international or regional 
organisations involved at more than one place.20 The 1982 LOS Convention already clearly 
lays down duties of the flag State.21 The Fish Stocks Agreement gives more detail to this 
provision with regard to fisheries. The details contain for instance membership of an 
RFMO, regulation of licences, establishment of a national vessel record and compliance 
with international guidelines for markings, monitoring, control and surveillance.22 
Right at the beginning of the negotiations of the Third UN Conference on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the International Court of Justice held “that the former laissez-
faire treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has been replaced by a 
recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of other States and the needs of 
conservation for the benefit of all.”23 This clear restriction, or at least alteration, of the 
freedom of the high seas found its way into the 1982 LOS Convention.24 As is already 
mentioned, the flag State is the principal actor to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas.25 
The 1982 LOS Convention lays down the duties for the flag State.26 In this regard, it is 
important always to keep in mind the due regard-principle. This provision mentions the 
“interests of other States” and does not specify if only flag States or also other than flag 
States are mentioned.27 Additionally, the section on the conservation and management of 
the living resources of the high seas obliges cooperation with other States.28 Again, the 
                                                        
19 See note 8 supra. 
20 1982 LOS Convention, Artt. 63 and 64 and Part VII, Section 2 and Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, pp. 207, 
285 and 286. 
21 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 94. 
22 Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 18. 
23 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), International 
Court of Justice, The Hague, 25 July 1974, Para. 72. 
24 M.H. Nordquist et al. (eds.). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary vol. 
III. The Hague, London and Boston (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1995, p. 287. 
25 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 92(1). 
26 See note 21 supra. 
27 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 87(2). 
28 Ibid., Artt. 116-118. 
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1982 LOS Convention gives no definition of “other States”. At a minimum, one could 
interpret this term as pointing towards coastal States. Nowadays, it might be useful to 
include also port States and maybe even market States.  
Conservation and management measures should be taken, supplementing the 
fishing rights of States’ nationals.29 Such measures should be based on the “best scientific 
evidence available” and biological, ecological, economic and environmental factors as well 
as fishing patterns should be taken into account while establishing these measures. 
Maintenance and restoration of populations is the key phrase. Moreover, the 1982 LOS 
Convention foreshadows the ecosystem approach by the reference to the importance of the 
interdependence of stocks.30 
Within the EEZ, the coastal State determines the applicable regulation for the use 
of living resources. Regulation should avoid over-exploitation.31 Furthermore, the coastal 
State should take into account the potential effects on the whole ecological system when it 
ensures the maintenance of living resources in the EEZ.32 In order to accomplish the 
purpose of optimal utilisation, what a coastal State cannot catch should be available for 
other States.33 These other States might especially include land-locked or other 
geographically disadvantaged States.34  
The fifth part of the 1982 LOS Convention on the EEZ lists five provisions that 
contain law on marine capture fisheries, which deal with specific categories of species or 
fish stocks. First, it considers stocks occurring in one or more EEZ and the high seas. It 
encourages States to cooperate with each other.35 The 1982 LOS Convention emphasises 
the importance of international organisations for both straddling and highly migratory 
species.36 Second, the article on highly migratory species calls for cooperation between 
coastal and other States with regard to these species both in and beyond the EEZ.37 Though 
the drafters placed this provision in the part of the 1982 LOS Convention on the EEZ, the 
part on the high seas follows the wording to a certain extent. All states have the right to let 
                                                        
29 Ibid., Artt. 117 and 118. 
30 Ibid., Art. 119(1) and see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary vol. III 
(1995) note 24 supra, p. 305. 
31 1982 LOS Convention, Art 61(2). 
32 Ibid., Art. 61(4). 
33 Ibid., Art. 62. 
34 Ibid., Artt. 62, 69 and 70. 
35 Ibid., Art. 63. 
36 Ibid., Artt. 63 and 64. 
37 Ibid., Art. 64(1). 
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their nationals fish on the high seas, subject however to what is laid down in, for example, 
the provision on highly migratory species.38  
Third, the 1982 LOS Convention allows coastal States or international 
organisations to regulate the catch of marine mammals.39 Some States made use of these 
provisions to prohibit such catch, as does the International Whaling Commission for 
whales to a large extent.40 Fourth, the 1982 LOS Convention provides a framework for the 
regulation of fishing for anadromous species.41 The primary responsibility for and benefits 
of these fisheries are taken away from the flag State and granted to the State of origin 
because these stocks originate in internal waters of States.42 The drafters of the 1982 LOS 
Convention preferred agreement between the State of origin and other States.43 The 1982 
LOS Convention also provides a role for regional organisations.44 Fifth, catadromous 
species begin their lives at sea but then migrate to fresh water. Though the catch of these 
stocks on the high seas is prohibited, the coastal State is the principal actor to regulate the 
conservation of these species.45 Finally, the EEZ regime is not applicable to sedentary 
species.46 
Noticeable is that fishing vessels might also be subject to the right of hot pursuit. 
This implies that the State of nationality of the pursuing vessel, in other words the coastal 
State, can exercise its jurisdiction on the high seas.47 Such a case unmistakably interferes 
with the flag States’ exclusive rights. 
                                                        
38 Ibid., Art. 116(b). 
39 Ibid., Artt. 65 and 120. 
40 See Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 317. 
41 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 66. 
42 Ibid., Art. 66(1), W.T. Burke. The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond. 
Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1994, pp. 166-169 and see Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 315. 
43 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 66(2)-(4). 
44 Ibid., Art. 66(5). Examples of this are given in Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, pp. 315 and 316. 
45 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 67. 
46 Ibid., Art. 68. 
47 Ibid., Art. 111. Of course, the violation of the law has then taken place in the territorial sea of the pursuing 
State. 
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Chapter 3 Flag State jurisdiction 
 
The freedom for every State to fish on the high seas has been undisputed for a long time. 
Nowadays, however, problems mount due to the rising capacities of fishing fleets all over 
the globe. Undoubtedly, this development brings with it an increasing burden for flag 
States, which in principal have the exclusive duty to control compliance of their fleet with 
international regulations. Nonetheless, a shift takes place with regard to this exclusive 
responsibility. The 2008 Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and the Law of the 
Sea recognizes that “there is now a prevailing view that fishing vessels on the high seas 
which are not effectively controlled by their flag States are liable to sanctions by other 
States should they happen to contravene international conservation and management 
measures”.48 Therefore, the question is to what extent an international legislative 
anticipation exists towards the shift away from flag State jurisdiction with regard to the 




Ever since Grotius proclaimed the absolute freedom of the high seas, flag States are the 
principal actors to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas. The 1982 LOS Convention splits 
this freedom into more than one freedom.49 Evidently, the high seas constitute, together 
with the deep-sea bed, the only area of the oceans were States could not claim sovereignty 
on the basis of their geographical position.50 Therefore, jurisdiction on the high seas has to 
be based on the nationality principle.   
A State, however, has not only jurisdiction over its nationals on a vessel. More 
important, the vessel itself must have a nationality.51 Back in the 1920s, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice held in the Lotus case that “vessels on the high seas are 
exclusively subject to the authority of the State whose flag they fly”.52 Granting nationality 
by the flag State is subject to certain conditions of which probably the most significant and 
at the same time the least clear prerequisite is that there “must exist a genuine link between 
                                                        
48 Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and Law of the Sea. UN Doc A/63/63. 10 March 2008, Para. 
249. 
49 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 87. 
50 Ibid., Artt. 89 and 137(1). 
51 See note 21 supra. 
52 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague, 7 September 1927. 
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the State and the ship.”53 The judgement of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nottebohm case - where such a requirement emerged with regard to the nationality of a 
person - clearly influenced the requirement of a genuine link.54  
It is unclear if the term “genuine link” constitutes codification of customary 
international law. In addition, it is up to States to decide whether or not they grant a vessel 
the right to fly its flag. For this purpose, it has the exclusive right to lay down rules and 
requirements in domestic legislation. In practice, States differ on how they implement the 
requirement of a genuine link. Moreover, it is not certain what the effect of the non-
existence of a genuine link between the vessel and its State of nationality is.55 Arguably, 
this problem creates “the most significant enforcement gap in the legal regime for the high 
seas.”56 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea addressed the issue in the M/V 
“Saiga” (No. 2) case where it held that “genuine link” under any circumstances means that 
the State of nationality must be capable of the effective exercise of jurisdiction and 
control.57 
The 1982 LOS Convention, among others, lists the rules to which flag States are 
subject.58 Although they seem to be extensive to a certain extent, many ways around them 
and space for broad interpretation are recognisable in practice. Nonetheless, it should first 
of all be noted that not all States in the world are a party to the 1982 LOS Convention and 
therefore, its provisions bind not all States.59 Second, not all States are capable or willing 
to make their vessels comply with the international standards. A State that is unable or 
unwilling to control its fleet according to the international legal standards is known as a 
flag of convenience. If, in a worse situation, non-compliance results, one speaks of flags of 
non-compliance. Ship-owners, and even criminal organisations, use these flag States to 
find a way around the law and this scheme often results in over-fishing and IUU fishing. 
The phenomenon of bareboat chartering thrives well also due to the existence of flags of 
convenience. In case of bareboat chartering, a vessel with the nationality of a State is 
                                                        
53 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 91. 
54 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, The Hague, 6 April 1955. 
55 See Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 258. 
56 R. Rayfuse. ‘The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link: Addressing 
Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’ in E.J. Molenaar and A.G. 
Oude Elferink (eds.). The International Legal Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current and 
Future Developments. Leiden (Martinus Nijhoff) 2010, pp. 165-190, p. 171. 
57 M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, The Hague, 1 July 1999, Paras. 80-83.  
58 See notes 53 and 21 supra. 
59 This is of course apart from the fact that some provisions might contain customary international law or 
provisions of earlier conventions. 
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chartered to a company in another State flying the flag of the latter during the period of 
chartering.60 
 
3.2 Vessel registration 
 
“Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.” That means 
that the piece of cloth a vessel flies is just a proof of its nationality. Flying the flag of a 
certain State does not give the vessel the nationality of that State. Then again, every State 
should to set conditions for the registration of ships.61 A State is also obliged to maintain 
such a register.62 To take the British example, this register contains different categories and 
fishing vessels constitute one.63 Many States have outsourced the management of their 
registries to a private company. For instance, the ship register of Sierra Leone has its office 
in New Orleans. The tight connections of these companies with both the flag State and the 
shipping industry makes such a construction prone to corruption. This situation is even 
more expected to occur if the flag State is unaware of, unable or unwilling to control 
vessels that are flying its flag, including fishing vessels. Especially, IUU fishing becomes 
more financially beneficial when the chances of being caught are smaller. The corruption 
takes, therefore, place from registration, authorisation and licensing to monitoring, control 
and enforcement.64 
Nonetheless, a ship that is not registered in only one State should be compared to a 
stateless ship or a vessel without nationality. The first exception in between these extremes 
is the fact that a vessel does not need to be registered because of its small size due to 
generally accepted international regulations or national law.65 It is not the intention of the 
drafters of this provision to exclude any vessels that are capable of sailing on the oceans. It 
is presumed that the excepted small vessels will mainly sail in coastal waters.66 Bareboat 
                                                        
60 See Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 262. 
61 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 91(1). 
62 Ibid., Art. 94(2)(a). 
63 As set out in S. Hodges and C. Hill. Principles of Maritime Law. London (LLP) 2001, p. 16.  
64 E. de Coning. Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry (publication prepared for the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 2011, pp. 118-128 and 147. 
65 See note 62 supra and Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 213, footnote 19. 
66 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary vol. III (1995) note 24 supra, 
p. 146. 
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chartering is the second exception.67 Additionally, it is not the case that every State can 
exercise jurisdiction over a stateless vessel.  
 
3.3 Beyond flag State jurisdiction 
 
A certain link between the vessel or the individuals on it and the State that exercises 
jurisdiction has to exist.68 On the one hand, the 1982 LOS Convention provides a few of 
these connections.69 On the other hand, this list is not exhaustive, so there might be more 
jurisdictional bases for a State to exercise jurisdiction.70 A coastal State has no more rights 
in its EEZ than the ones that are listed in the relevant part of the 1982 LOS Convention.71 
For example, the coastal State may not exercise custom jurisdiction in the EEZ.72 It is 
suggested, however, that in the case of stateless vessels, the coastal State can exercise 
jurisdiction regardless of the reason to exercise it.73 A coastal State does not necessarily 
have to be a party to the 1982 LOS Convention to call upon it. The EEZ regime is regarded 
as customary international law.74 
The exclusiveness of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas has 
created considerable criticism. An increasing amount of problems, and sometimes 
disasters, in the field of pollution and overfishing resulted in the suggestion of more than 
only jurisdiction by flag States on the high seas.75 Cooperation on a regional scale between 
coastal States and States of nationality of vessels that fish on the high seas (distant-water 
fishing States) is highly recommended because of the particular transboundary 
characteristic of fish stocks.76 In the past, such cooperation seemed doomed to be 
ineffective.77  
                                                        
67 See note 60 supra. 
68 See Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 214. 
69 Ibid. and 1982 LOS Convention, Part VII. 
70 1982 LOS Convention, Art. 87(2) and Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 205. 
71 Part V is the starting point for the EEZ in the 1982 LOS Convention. See also Churchill (1999) note 8 
supra, p. 160. 
72 See M/V “Saiga” (No. 2), note 59 supra, Para. 127. 
73 See note 68 supra. 
74 Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), International Court of Justice, 
The Hague, 3 June 1985, Para. 34 and see Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, pp. 161 and 162. 
75 M.N. Shaw. International Law. 5th edition. Cambridge etc. (Cambridge University Press) 2003, p. 543, 
A.G. Oude Elferink. ‘De Groot – A founding father of the law of the sea, not the Law of the Sea convention’ 
2009 Grotiana, pp. 153-168 and see Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, p. 205. The latter concisely presents 
further discussion at p. 220.  
76 See Birnie (2009) note 7 supra, p. 739. 
77 See Churchill (1999) note 8 supra, pp. 286, 287 and 297. 
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Art. 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement contains the key provisions of the trial to 
finally reach the goal of effective cooperation. The Fish Stocks Agreement encourages 
States further to collaborate on no less than thirteen points.78 This list forms the basis of 
RFMOs. Evidently, these organisations operate in the regional sphere in contrast with for 
example the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals that all contain provisions for the 
global environment and therefore also some concerning fish stocks in the high seas. To 
return to the RFMOs, it is said that these globally applicable rules for regional 
organisations and their members indicate an obligatory character. This property is twofold 
in a way that it forms a basis for the RFMOs and obliges member States to comply with 
them.79   
Besides this, certain provisions make it practically impossible to exercise a right to 
fish for a State when it is not a member of an RFMO.80 Moreover, the fourth part of the 
Fish Stocks Agreement holds provisions for non-members of organisations and States that 
are not participating in arrangements. There even exists an incentive for State parties to the 
Fish Stocks Agreement to promote other States to become a party.81 Although it is not 
clear if the Fish Stocks Agreement will contribute to the eradication of IUU fishing, 
arguably, the included rules are based on the access to high seas fishing rather than on 
freedoms of the high seas.82 The fact that more States might, amongst other actions, arrest 
vessels contributes to the thought that flag State jurisdiction on the high seas starts to 
diminish nowadays.83  
 
3.4 Expert consultation on flag State performance 
 
The instruments that are discussed above outline just the general obligations and 
encouragements in existence for States and international and regional instruments. In 
preparation of draft criteria or international guidelines to lay down these obligations, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had the ability to organise 
                                                        
78 Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 10. 
79 See note 76 supra. 
80 Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 8(3) and (4). 
81 Ibid., Part XI. 
82 See Birnie (2009) note 7 supra, p. 740. 
83 Fish Stocks Agreement, Artt. 21 and 22 and note 76 supra. 
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an expert consultation on the subject. In June 2009, such a consultation was held to discuss 
the topic of flag State performance. Already in the opening statement of that consultation, 
Nomura, then Assistant Director-General of the FAO for Fisheries and Aquaculture, 
acknowledged that with regard to the fishing fleets that fly a flag of non-compliance “the 
burden to control these fleets, which has a high price tag, is shifted to other States, 
including coastal States, port States and members of regional fisheries management 
organizations and arrangements”.84 This opinion seems to be based on the 2008 Report of 
the Secretary General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, quoted in the introduction.85 The 
consultation was merely focused on the fight against IUU fishing on the high seas and in 
EEZs.86 Experts delivered six papers and presentations and all of these received a comment 
of other experts. Four of these papers are relevant for the discussion below. 
 Hogan, Deputy Director of the U.S. Office of Marine Conservation, sets out criteria 
for assessing the performance of flag States in the first paper.87 These criteria itself should 
also be subject to timely assessment.88 The author also argues that a clear legal basis to 
assess the compliance of fishing vessels is present - both implicit and explicit. With regard 
to the implicit part, the reasoning starts with the fact that the 1982 LOS Convention and 
subsequent legal instruments codify cooperation in conservation and management between 
States. Consequently, Hogan views upon the assessment of flag State performance as a 
measure of cooperation. The explicit obligation rests in the performance assessments 
eventually required by RFMOs.89  
 Further, the paper emphasises the existence of reciprocity in flag State 
performance. If a flag State makes sure its fleet will comply with international regulation, 
such a State expects the same of other flag States. Moreover, the author is of the opinion 
that, apart from the reciprocity, this expectation is seen more as a responsibility or moral 
obligation, especially in cases of fisheries on the high seas.90 The other side of the coin 
shows an obvious advantage for States, companies and individual vessels that do not obey 
                                                        
84 FAO. Report of the Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance (Rome, 23–26 June 2009) FAO 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Report no. 918. Rome (FAO) 2009, p. 16. 
85 See note 48 supra. 
86 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 1. 
87 Ibid., pp. 24-27. 
88 Ibid., p. 23. 
89 Ibid., p. 21. 
90 Ibid., p. 20. 
  18 
the rules. Namely, they can proceed with hardly controlled harvesting, which delivers them 
an advantageous competition for the resources and its markets.91  
 Even then, there exist situations where the flag State or a RFMO barely covers the 
compliance of vessels. This is where port State control can come into play, necessarily.92 It 
follows that it is practical to have a division on compliance assessment between flag States, 
port States, coastal States and RFMOs. Such a division in itself asks for “a comprehensive 
framework that could provide the basis to draw conclusions on flag State performance 
under a wide range of application, and be adaptable to specific circumstances”.93 These 
criteria mainly try to heal the deficiencies in the system of compliance control. In other 
words, the report touches upon the desirable improvement of negative behaviour of States. 
The comment strives for the contrary and tries to stimulate flags of integrity. By unveiling 
the benefits of flying such a flag, for example access to product markets with higher prices, 
the international community could motivate States to compliance.94  
 Rayfuse, professor of International Law at the University of New South Wales, 
addresses possible actions against vessels flying the flags of States not meeting the criteria 
for flag State performance in the second paper. She delivers a very clear-cut view on the 
responsibility of the flag State: “only those States which effectively control their vessels 
enjoy the freedom to fish.” The author leaves no leeway for flags of non-compliance by 
stating that a State that is unable or unwilling to make its fleet comply should not allow 
vessels to fly its flag. Moreover, a State that denies this obligation is internationally 
responsible and vessels flying a flag of non-compliance can be compared to stateless 
vessels.95 Injured States should be able to act through countermeasures against the flag 
State that fails to comply.96 The paper offers a whole set of possible actions against flag 
States and requirements therefore, categorised in three options: self-assessment, unilateral 
assessment and multilateral assessment.97  
 Lugten, senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University of Tasmania, deals 
with the role of national governments in implementing criteria and actions for flag State 
performance in the third paper. She suggests that potential flag States should investigate 
                                                        
91 See note 89 supra. 
92 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 22. 
93 See note 88 supra. 
94 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 2. 
95 Ibid., pp. 29, 34 and 36. 
96 Ibid., p. 36. 
97 Ibid., pp. 31-38. 
  19 
the history of a ship that wants to register. Furthermore, a State should only grant a vessel 
its flag if it is capable of exercising control regarding that particular vessel.98 The idea of 
linking fishing permits to registration is copied from the International Plan of Action to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of 2001 (IPOA-
IUU).99 This plan contains many ideas to improve the current practice in controlling 
compliance by providing possibilities of actions by the flag States themselves, coastal 
States, port States, market States and RFMOs. Miller, Executive Secretary of the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, discusses the role 
of regional fisheries management organizations in implementing criteria and actions for 
flag State performance in the fourth paper. He provides many guidelines to circumscribe 
this function for RFMOs in practice.100 
                                                        
98 Ibid., p. 44. 
99 Ibid., pp. 44 and 45 and IPOA-IUU, Paras. 40 and 41. 
100 See FAO (2009) note 86 supra, pp. 64-71. 
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Chapter 4 Current role of classification societies 
 
It is undisputable that rights go hand in hand with duties in many legal systems. This 
principle is also valid for the rights of a flag State. As outlined above, the 1982 LOS 
Convention lays down the most general flag State duties.101 The assessment of the 
technical requirements in this regard began in the private sector. In the early 1760s in 
London, a group of underwriters started to classify ships according to the ships’ condition 
in order to provide insurances. Not only insurers but also the owners of the cargo became 
interested in the application. They soon created a register of ships. Over the centuries, this 
idea developed into a system of classification societies that examines the quality of 
ships.102 This indeed is directly a limitation of working field of classification societies: 
their responsibilities do not extend to manning and operation of vessels.103 Harmonisation 
of the classification standards is currently one of the main goals of the ten largest 
classification societies.104 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Nowadays, it is custom to provide the name of the classification society, the rating of the 
vessel and when the last survey took place in the official papers of, for example, the sale of 
a ship. Inspection of the report of the classification society by a potential buyer is, 
therefore, normal procedure.105 The quality of the classification society is of great 
importance because a potential insurer will take its track record into account.106 Not 
applying for a new survey in time can cause the ‘loss of class’.107 Strictly seen, it is not 
obligatory for ship-owners to have their vessels classified. In practice however, it will be 
close to impossible to obtain insurance or sell a vessel without a classification. 
Consequently, a vessel cannot sail when it has no class. Even if a ship has a classification, 
caution is important because it is not sure if the seller reported all defects to the 
                                                        
101 See note 58 supra. 
102 R. Grime. Shipping Law. 2nd edition. London (Sweet & Maxwell) 1991, p. 75. 
103 M. Strong and P. Herring. Sale of Ships: The Norwegian Saleform. 2nd edition. London (Sweet & Maxwell 
Thomson Reuters) 2010, p. 416 and see Özçayir (2004) note 110 infra. 
104 I. Goldrein and P. Turner. Ship Sale and Purchase. 4th edition. London (LLP) 2003, p. 2. 
105 Ibid., p. 1. 
106 See note 104 supra. 
107 See Grime (1991) note 102 supra, p. 76. 
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classification society.108 Classification, in short, “provides a practical method of 
maintaining standards.”109 The maintenance of these standards is not only done by 
classification but also by the detection of defects in the vessels.110 
Where classification is still the obvious main function, the experts working for a 
society can now be hired for any task concerning a vessel’s condition. With assessing the 
requirements of international agreements regarding shipping, classification societies 
moved into the field of flag State duties as well.111 Since the nineteenth century, regulation 
and inspection fall under their responsibilities too.112 Flag States and port States rely 
nowadays heavily on the documents of surveys by classification societies.113 In fact, not all 
flag States have the capability to examine vessels regarding their compliance with the 
national and international requirements. Neither do flag States have a global network of 
surveyors to carry out this work.114 Therefore – at the moment of writing – approximately 
120 States use classification societies for these purposes.115 As far as insurance is 
concerned, the specialised Protection and Indemnity Clubs also require a ship to have or 
obtain a certain class. Evidently, this business relies upon classification societies.116 A 
strict division in public and private functions is, arguably, hard to sustain.117 Both in the 
private and the public sector, the question concerning the liability of classification societies 
emerges.118 Fortunately, an increasing amount of measures starts to fill up what was not 
too long ago regarded as a vacuum.119 
                                                        
108 See Goldrein and Turner (2003) note 104 supra, pp. 3, 5 and 6 and see Özçayir (2004) note 110 infra, p. 
480. 
109 See Grime (1991) note 102 supra, p. 77. 
110 Z.O. Özçayir. Port State Control. London (LLP) 2004, p. 479. 
111 Ibid., p. 480 and see note 102 supra. 
112 P. Boisson, ‘Classification societies and safety at sea: Back to basics and prepare for the future’. 1994 
Marine Policy no. 5, pp. 363-377, p. 363. 
113 See Falkanger (2011) note 117 infra, pp. 83 and 84, R. Pilley and F. Lorenzon. ‘International Regulations 
for Ship Operators, their Verification and Enforcement, in: Southampton on Shipping Law. London (Informa) 
2008, pp. 227-249, p. 246 and see Boisson (1994) note 112 supra, p. 371 and Mandaraka-Sheppard (2009) 
note 121 infra, p. 283. 
114 See Vorbach (2001) note 115 infra, p. 31 and see Boisson (1994) note 112 supra, p. 371. 
115 J.E. Vorbach, 'The Vital Role of Non-Flag State Actors in the Pursuit of Safer Shipping'. 2001 Ocean 
Development & International Law no. 1, pp. 27—42, p. 33. 
116 Ibid., p. 32. 
117 T. Falkanger, H.J. Bull and L. Brautaset. Scandinavian Maritime Law: The Norwegian Perspective. 3rd 
edition. Oslo (Universitetsforlaget) 2011, p. 72. 
118 R. Pilley and F. Lorenzon. ‘International Regulations for Ship Operatorss, their Verification and 
Enforcement, in: Southampton on Shipping Law. London (Informa) 2008, pp. 227-249, pp. 245-249, M. 
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Thomson Reuters) 2010, pp. 241-245 and see Hodges (2001) note 63 supra, pp. 43-47 and Mandaraka-
Sheppard (2009) note 121 infra, pp. 522-531. 
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In order to improve flag State performance in the field of fisheries, this thesis 
proposes the involvement of classification societies. However, very few documents or 
literature deal with such a proposal. In other words, involvement of classification societies 
in global fisheries is undoubtedly only in the proposal phase yet. Nevertheless, the 
encouragement is there and few references have been made lately and it is regarded 
valuable to take notice of these cases.120 First of all, a necessary step is to determine the 
already existing scope of classification societies and the potential scope of these non-profit 
non-governmental organisations. 
 
4.2 Origin of potential role for classification societies 
 
As with so many ideas, it is hard to track the exact first thought of the potential application 
of classification societies in the field of fisheries or the mentioning thereof. With the birth 
of the first classification society already halfway the eighteenth century, it is not very 
likely that the proposal came up only recently. Nonetheless, the notion of the possible 
depletion of fish stocks does not date back that far. Thus, the negative side of the use of 
flags of convenience within fisheries receives mounting attention in recent decades. This 
unclear history serves the purpose of pointing out only a few useful instances where the 
idea might have evolved.  
Reeman v Department of Trade and Others, a civil liability case in the United 
Kingdom, provides the first illustration.121 A fishing vessel that is registered in the United 
Kingdom needs a certificate of the Department of Trade to sail out. In order to receive such 
a certificate, the vessel needs to be inspected by a surveyor that is appointed by the 
Department of Trade. However, in this case, the Department of Trade based the 
certification upon a miscalculation. The outcome of the case is not relevant, only the fact 
that the role of the surveyor is similar to that of a classification society is important. In 
other words, this practice in the United Kingdom - and the subsequent use of this particular 
case in the common law system – illustrates the fact that classification societies within the 
field of fisheries do not have to be an entire novelty. 
At this point, it is deemed necessary to emphasise the role of a classification society 
when it fulfils public duties - in other words: the statutory services that classification 
                                                        
120 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 33. 
121 As outlined in A. Mandaraka-Sheppard, Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management. 2nd edition. 
London (Informa) 2009, at pp. 527 and 528. 
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societies provide. The societies are neutral, impartial and independent. The responsible 
ones are committed to ship safety. Undoubtedly, surveyors of a flag State should have the 
same characteristics. In practice however, not every flag State is able or willing to exercise 
its duties itself. This is the moment where the classification society comes into play. They 
have a worldwide network of highly qualified engineers who only are allowed to work for 
one employer, in casu the classification society. Every flag State finds a balance in what it 
delegates to a classification society and what it executes itself. Evidently, one extreme is 
that a flag State delegates everything to a classification society, the other is that a flag 
States delegates nothing. The Federal Republic of Germany is an example of a flag State 
that executes some of its duties by its own surveyors and delegates some of them to a 
particular classification society. One last remark in this regard is that classification 
societies do not assess the seaworthiness of a vessel. That is the responsibility of the 
owner.  
This being said, it should be admitted directly that there exists a less far-fetched 
hint on the application of classification societies. Therefore, a short introduction to the 
international regulatory system concerning port State control is essential. There is no 
legally binding instrument with a global scope for port State control, although many IMO 
conventions contain provisions on the issue. Instead, a chain of regional non-binding 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) has been negotiated. These MoUs are applicable to 
the shipping industry - the industry in which classification societies are so important. 
Fishing vessels are normally excluded from these MoUs122 and therewith also 
automatically the application of classification societies. It is also contested that inspection 
of fishing vessels in the framework of port State control is the best option to achieve 
compliance in the sphere of conservation and management of marine living resources 
although it can serve as a model for the development of a new agreement regarding 
fisheries.123 The outcome of this process is the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Port State 
Measures Agreement). 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the application of such a MoU to fishing 
vessels creates a window of opportunity for the application of classification societies in 
fisheries. A very careful first move in this direction might have occurred a few years ago. 
                                                        
122 See Fitzpatrick (2001) note 16 supra, Para. 35. 
123 Ibid., Para. 36 and see Lobach (2001) note 130 infra, Paras. 32 and 33. 
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Two of the most important ones, the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MoU, organised their 
second joint ministerial conference in 2004. The following statement of the Ministerial 
Declaration is significant: “To support the continuing efforts of relevant international 
organizations in the development of measures to combat IUU fishing.” This support should 
be followed up by the following action under the two MoUs: “To consider the expansion 
of PSC to fishing vessels and further consider ratification of the Torremolinos Convention 
and STCW 95-F.”124 The former convention deals with safety of fishing vessels and the 
latter abbreviation stands for the 1995 International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel. 
 
4.3 Levels of analysis in international politics 
 
In order to be able to analyse the potential role of classification societies in fisheries, an 
explanation of different levels on the international plane might be helpful. In the sphere of 
international politics, it has become natural to make a distinction in the levels at which 
influence and power can occur. In case of the use of classification societies in global 
fisheries, a similar distinction could be helpful to determine were the existing and potential 
responsibilities occur. First of all, it is essential to note that vessels are the units that are 
controlled by the State in a regulatory manner. It is the flag State that bears flag State 
responsibility and not the crew of the vessel or its owner. In between these two levels, the 
operational space of classification societies is defined. One could argue that they fulfil an 
outsourced public task.  
Next to the individual (vessel) level and the State level, there is the international 
level. International agreements and instruments shape the latter. It is quintessential to 
realise at this stage that the classification societies do not currently operate between the 
international and the State level. In other words, classification societies are not able to 
assess flag States’ behaviour. Notwithstanding this point, an extra level of relevance 
emerges right in between that of the State and the international level. In the case of 
fisheries, this regional level is gaining importance.125 RFMOs might provide a stage for 
                                                        
124 Sub-Committee of the International Maritime Organisation on Flag State Implementation (submitted by 
the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU). Update on actions emanating from the Second Inter-regional Ministerial 
Conference on Port State Control. 19 January 2009. FSI 17/INF.6, Annex, p. 2. 
125 A. D’Andrea. The “genuine link” concept in responsible fisheries: Legal aspects and recent 
developments. FAO Legal Papers Online no. 61. 2006, p. 12. 
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classification societies. Namely, RFMOs build their regulations heavily on the provisions 
that are provided by international fisheries law, as outlined above.126 
                                                        
126 See Lobach, note 130 infra, Paras. 35-43. 
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Chapter 5 Potential role of classification societies in marine capture fisheries 
 
Improving flag State performance is possible in different ways. A range of different kinds 
of jurisdictions might be engaged in reaching this purpose. One can deduce from this 
hierarchy that port State authority is secondary to flag State jurisdiction.127 Port State 
control can never be a substitution for the responsibility of flag States. If the latter cannot 
or will not live up to the expectations of the international community with regard to 
shipping standards, “the port State comes into play. The control measures taken under port 
State control are supposed to be regarded as complementary to national measures taken by 
flag State administrations and are intended to provide assistance to these 
administrations.”128 The General Assembly of the UN once more underlines this point 
when stating that although “flag States have primary responsibility for ensuring the 
effective implementation and enforcement of such instruments, coastal States and port 
States have had an increasingly important role due to the failure of some flag States to 
exercise effective control over vessels flying their flag.”129 Port States could of course 
provide this assistance with their own surveyors but the technical knowledge of the 
surveyors of classification societies might be of an additional value. 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
It has to be emphasised that classification societies mainly examine the status of the vessel 
in a technical way. The surveyors are most of time highly qualified engineers. A natural 
result is that the focus lies less on the activities of the vessel. The practice of visiting a 
vessel only once in certain period of time reinforces this perception. For the sake of clarity, 
it might be helpful to note that a surveyor from a classification society is thus more 
familiar with assessing a static situation. However, a dynamic situation – the activity of 
fishing – constitutes the problem regarding the lack of flag State performance in the field 
of fisheries. Improving flag State performance should therefore focus in the first place on 
fishing and to what extent this activity is carried out according to applicable regulations. 
Second, the status of the technicalities on board that provide the ability to fish is of 
                                                        
127 See Vorbach (2001) note 115 supra, p. 34. 
128 See Özçayir (2004) note 110 supra, p. 1. 
129 Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and Law of the Sea. UN Doc A/66/70/Add. 1. 11 April 2011, 
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significance. In the latter setting, there might be room for the use of classification 
societies.130 
The notion of IUU fishing could be viewed upon as one of the main boosters for 
the development that aims for sustainable fisheries since the start of the 21st century. It 
was, for instance, in this regard that the States took up the idea to draft the Port State 
Measures Agreement. This inseparable connection between the combat of IUU fishing and 
port State regulation needs to be memorised at all times. Considering this reminder, not all 
tools to fight IUU fishing lay within in the capacity of the fisheries manager. To be more 
specific, the instruments that are needed to reach the aim of sustainable fisheries extend 
beyond competences of fisheries management. Port State authority provides a good 
example here because the involvement of the IMO and its legal instruments is obvious. 
Operating at night without lights, lacking proper marking, abandoning fishing gear, 
disabling positioning systems that are used for vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and 
modifying the construction of the vessel in order to hide illegal catches constitute 
violations of administrative laws, which are not necessarily regulating fisheries only.131  
It goes without saying that classification societies have the proper experience to 
examine at least a few of these offences. Although, the legal basis for such action is non-
existent yet because the main instruments that currently regulate port State control – 
regional MoUs – are not willing to extent their sphere of competence to fisheries.132 
Provisions of many convention – either in force or not – could be used as a starting point to 
create a legal basis for port State control of fishing vessels. High priority to develop an 
agreement that provides such legal basis is already stated right at the start of the fight 
against IUU fishing.133 Classification societies know how to examine vessels on the basis 
of these conventions. This conclusion suggests looking at the fisheries from the shipping 
perspective. But because this approach would possibly not go beyond the copy and 
modification of articles into a new instrument that is applicable to fisheries, it is rather 
                                                        
130 A similar point is made in T. Lobach. ‘Measures to be adopted by the port State in combating IUU 
fishing’ in FAO, Report of and papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and 
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131 See Fitzpatrick (2001) note 16 supra, Paras. 7 and 35. 
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133 See Fitzpatrick (2001) note 16 supra, Paras. 37 and 42, Lobach (2001) note 130 supra, Paras. 33 and 34, 
and note 150 infra. 
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more interesting to look at potential tasks for classification societies in the existing 




The involvement of classification societies in the field of fisheries brings risks with it too. 
Classification societies need to be totally independent and non-profit.135 Otherwise, the 
exercise of public tasks as authorisation and control would turn into a dangerous 
development. In this regard, a port State control officer should be differentiated from a 
surveyor who works for a classification society. The former may not in any way be 
affiliated with a classification society.136 History shows that when private entities fulfil 
public roles that are similar to those of the police or the armed forces, lines of 
responsibility blur. Armed forces should be mentioned here because in many countries the 
coast guard is part of the navy. Classification societies in a public role have therefore no 
enforcement capabilities.137 Liability of classification societies is already a heavily debated 
issue in many jurisdictions.138 Therefore, it seems wise to limit the role of classification 
societies to the tasks that they are used to: assessment of the static technical condition of 
the ship and - to a lesser extent - its activities. When a classification society collects data in 
order to achieve the final goals of flag State performance improvement, such activity 
should happen in an atmosphere of total transparency and openness.139 
 It might be mentioned at this point that classification societies themselves are 
currently more thoroughly scrutinised as well. Increasing competition among them brings 
with it the risk of being less strict in applying the rules in order to keep or attract clients.140 
Moreover, the image of classification societies is damaged due to huge pollution accidents 
that recently took place in Europe.141 Classification societies are known as ‘recognised 
organisations’ within the IMO. A code for these recognised organisations is under 
development. This code would sum up all the relevant provisions in the IMO conventions 
                                                        
134 See Fitzpatrick (2001) note 16 supra, Para. 38. 
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with regard to classification societies in order to provide a clear overview. The creation of 
minimum standards for recognised organisations is important in this regard.142 The 
European Union (EU) already centralised its policy concerning recognised 
organisations.143 For instance, member States should submit a request to the European 
Commission if they plan to recognise a new organisation. The IMO requires many more 
detailed regulations of recognised organisations and the EU is among those to have 
implemented these rules.144 Implementation of these rules in general, however, is arguably 
ineffective – both through flag States, port States and the IMO itself – and creates as such 
an essential weakness for the effectuation of flag State responsibility.145 
 
5.3  Possible types and sources of assessment criteria 
 
To proceed to the core, it needs to be answered in what fields of the worldwide fishing 
industry classification societies might become active. Following the levels of analysis in 
international politics, it would not be surprising to analyse international fisheries law at the 
international, regional and national level. The approach that this thesis takes is, however, 
restricted to the international level due to the high amounts of legislation at the other two 
levels. Anyway, the hierarchy in the international system requires starting with an 
examination of the provision of fisheries law at the international level that may provide 
room for the application of classification societies. The 1982 LOS Convention is the 
obvious instrument to start when it comes to international fisheries law because it provides 
the most widely accepted regulatory framework for the oceans. Consequently, subsequent 
instruments – containing either hard law or soft law – are based on the provisions in the 
1982 LOS Convention.  
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1982 LOS Convention 
 
At the outset of this paragraph, it is significant to clarify the scope for classification 
societies again regarding their potential function in the field of fisheries. They will be used 
to improve flag State performance. Flag States are the prime actors on the high seas. 
Surveyors of classification societies operate mainly in ports and the port State is not 
necessarily the coastal State or the flag State as well. When it comes to the fishing in the 
EEZ, the coastal State has the regulatory competence.146 Nationals from other States than 
the coastal State should of course comply with the rules. A few of these obligations are 
spelled out.147 For instance, the licences of the fishermen, their vessels and equipment 




The FAO deals with all the issues concerning fisheries and in that respect the organisation 
tries to combat flags of convenience. Since UNCLOS III, there was still an increasing 
practice of reflagging - in other words reregistering vessels for the convenience of its 
owners and to circumvent general applicable rules on the high seas or regulations by 
RFMOs.148 The failure of the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for the 
Registration of Ships (Registration Convention), in the sense that it is heavily criticised 
and has not entered into force yet, might have contributed to the idea of dealing with the 
problems created by the genuine link in the field of fisheries itself.149  
Swan suggests taking this Registration Convention as a model for the development 
of a fisheries agreement that covers the same topic.150 Copying the provision that asserts 
that vessels of a flag State “are periodically surveyed by its authorized surveyors in order 
to ensure compliance with applicable international rules and standards” would form a 
perfect basis for the introduction of classification societies in the field of fisheries.151 
Further, the Registration Convention lists many data and documents that could possibly be 
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checked by surveyors of classification societies if its provisions were applicable to fishing 
vessels and it entered into force. 
The process within the FAO concerning compliance in the fishing industry resulted 
in the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
management Measure by Fishing Vessels in the High Seas (Compliance Agreement). The 
preamble lays down the objective to reduce the amount of reflagging vessels next to the 
emphasis that the right to fish on the high seas is subject to international regulations. 
Furthermore, the Compliance Agreement encourages States to cooperate and to participate 
in fisheries organisations.152 The emphasis on the responsibility of the flag State is clear. A 
flag State should strive for the prevention of “any activity that undermines the 
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures.”153 And these 
measures should also be applicable to small vessels, which fall initially outside the scope 
of the Compliance Agreement.154 This provision reinforces the obligation for State parties 
to make the vessels that fly its flag comply with the rules; the State should expressly 
authorise a vessel to fish on the high seas.155 The examination if these authorisations are 
obeyed might be a potential task for classification societies.  
The burden is even higher as far as fishing on the high seas is concerned. Effective 
exercise of flag State responsibility is then a prerequisite for authorisation.156 The 
obligatory marking of vessels provides another point of examination.157 Reflagging of a 
ship is also subject to severe conditions to limit this undesirable practice.158 To enforce 
sanctions, the Compliance Agreement promotes other States’ support. A special role is, for 
the first time, reserved for the port State.159 It lists technicalities of vessels that 
classification societies could potentially examine.160 In addition, the Compliance 
Agreement urges its parties to do everything in their power to prevent non-parties from 
violating international conservation and management measures.161  
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The creation of national records for fishing vessels is a novelty in the Compliance 
Agreement.162 Fishing vessels are normally exempted from national ship registers.163 A 
record of vessels, however, is not the same as a register of vessels. Maritime 
administrations, shipbuilders and classification societies supply the IMO with information 
for a global record concerning the shipping industry.164 This idea could be copied to the 
fishing industry. Consequently, classification societies could then not only provide input 
for such a record but also profit from the data in it while examining vessels. The 
transparency and exchange of information that is aimed for in the Compliance Agreement 
is very supportive for this development.165 The process within the FAO for the creation of 
a global record for fishing vessels has gone through important stages already and experts 
also promote the transparency and openness of such a record.166 Earlier attempts to 
construct a global record failed but currently the necessary procedures are finalised.167 
One of the other purposes of the global record is “strengthening risk assessment for 
both governments and industry at all levels”.168 This function seems to fit the role of a 
classification society perfectly because it comprehends exactly their experience. Large 
fishing vessels are already included in the record that the IMO uses and this commercial 
record offers many particularities that could be reproduced in the fishing industry, 
including a unique vessel identifier.169 Many RFMOs already use fishing vessel records, so 
the regional level seems to be ahead of the international level.170 
 
Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention concerning straddling and highly migratory 
fish stocks needed implementation just over a decade after their acceptance. The resulting 
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Fish Stocks Agreement has many purposes of which one codifies the increasing 
significance of port States. The preamble lays down the wish for more effective 
enforcement of conservation and management measures by all kinds of States. Both coastal 
States and States that are involved in high seas fishing shall care for effective monitoring, 
control and surveillance.171 The Fish Stocks Agreement also encourages the deterrence of 
violation by vessels that are flying the flag of non-parties.172 In both the provisions for port 
States and flag States, the first encouragement that the drafters provide is international or 
regional cooperation.173 These rules form a good example of a detailed elaboration on its 
counterparts in the 1982 LOS Convention.174 The extensive rights of port States are merely 
a codification of customary international law.175 
The third and fourth part of the Fish Stocks Agreement deal with mechanisms for 
international cooperation as do some articles in Part VI. The latter gives special attention to 
port States. The Fish Stocks Agreement attributes the power of inspection of documents, 
fishing gear and catch on board to port States.176 Especially the former two components 
may be potential tasks for classification societies. Furthermore, the Fish Stocks Agreement 
emphasises duties for flag States.177 The Fish Stocks Agreement repeats in a slightly more 
detailed manner the provision concerning authorisation of fishing vessels and the 
accompanying requirements from the Compliance Agreement.178 The same is true for the 
paragraphs on a national vessel record and the requirements for marking of vessels and 
gear.179 Moreover, the Fish Stocks Agreement makes a start with encouraging the 
development of VMS.180 Again, classification societies are perfectly suited to check 
licences, markings and VMS. 
Sustainable use is a recurring theme throughout the whole Fish Stocks Agreement. 
Evidently, States should pursue the protection of both target and non-target species.181 
Further, the precautionary approach and ecosystem approach should guide the fishing 
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measures.182 Whatever happens, States have to take into account that the same fish stocks 
live under both national jurisdiction and the areas beyond. Thus, States should have 
compatibility of measures as a goal.183 And if States could not agree on conservation 
measures directly, they should place “provisional arrangements of a practical nature” 
instead.184 
 
Code of Conduct 
 
Responsibility is evidently what the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(Code of Conduct) focuses on. The Code of Conduct links the right to fish directly to 
effective “conservation and management of the living aquatic resources”.185 Further, the 
Code of Conduct hints on a clear ecosystem approach concerning the availability, diversity 
and quality of resources for today and in the future.186 This long-term perspective is of 
crucial significance with regard to fisheries management.187 The emphasis on the 
ecological system as a whole means unmistakably the integration of fisheries management 
into the bigger picture of coastal zone management.188 Regional cooperation is an 
inevitable part of the latter.189 The emphasis on the “best scientific evidence available” 
reoccurs, related to the precautionary approach.190 Furthermore, a severe stance should be 
taken against vessels undermining the effectiveness of measures and not flying the flag of 
a contracting party to the relevant RFMO.191 Destructive fishing operations should be 
prohibited to diminish the devastating effects on the ecosystem.192 
The Code of Conduct is directly connected to other international fisheries 
instruments that were adopted in the 1980s and 1990s.193 Consequently, this soft-law 
instrument strives for compliance and enforcement. Monitoring and control of fishing 
vessels is an inseparable part of that.194 Flag States should provide access to insurance for 
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ship-owners and –charterers.195 Since classification societies are founded for this specific 
reason, they can assist along the whole process of insurance. The examination of 
compliance with safety requirements and requirements regarding the reduction of pollution 
provide two other tailor-made opportunities for the involvement of classification 
societies.196 Concerning port States, the Code of Conduct urges cooperation with and 
assistance of other States in the fulfilment of their duties, especially flag States.197 
One of the topics that the Code of Conduct also brings to the attention of the public 
is the issue of capacity. Avoidance, prevention, reduction and elimination are the goals 
concerning excess capacity of the fishing fleet.198 The International Plan of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity) implements these provisions. Though 
both instruments’ suggestions are not directly applicable to the potential involvement of 
classification societies, there might exist a role for the latter. Both the Code of Conduct and 
the IPOA-Capacity are directed towards overcapacity at the State level. Excessive capacity 
at individual vessels, however, might be eligible to examination by classification 
societies.199 
When it comes to the prevention and elimination of IUU fishing, the FAO provides 
guidance with the IPOA-IUU. Its principles are to a certain extent derived from or related 
to those described in the Code of Conduct.200 The IPOA-IUU covers collaboration between 
States and sets out very generally what measures should be taken, at first.201 Nevertheless, 
many – if not almost all – of the given encouragements are applicable for RFMOs. This 




From the negotiations of the Fish Stocks Agreement onwards, bycatch and discards 
attracted the attention of international lawyers. In its general principles, the Fish Stocks 
Agreement tries to minimise “discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-
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target species, both fish and non-fish species, (hereinafter referred to as non-target species) 
and impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular endangered species, through 
measures including, to the extent practicable, the development and use of selective, 
environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and techniques”.203 In addition, the 
Fish Stocks Agreement encourages States to provide data on the catch of non-target 
species, which is reiterated for the duties of flag States.204 Furthermore, it regulates 
observance, inspection and monitoring of this information and lays down the need to 
ensure compliance with international rules on this issue.205  
Where the Fish Stocks Agreement only pushes coastal States and States that have 
vessels fishing on the high seas to cooperate with regard to the abovementioned phrases, 
the Code of Conduct uses stronger language. States simply should minimise “catch of non-
target species, both fish and non-fish species, and impacts on associated or dependent 
species”.206 Moreover, the precautionary approach and ecosystem approach come visibly 
into play in the Code of Conduct. The topic of bycatch and discards, which is dealt with in 
the Code of Conduct on various places, is one where technical requirements play a major 
role. The use of selective gear is important in this regard and management measures should 
aim to encourage this usage.207 This obligation exists also more in general concerning gear, 
methods and practices.208 The International Plans of Action implement these 
encouragements from the Code of Conduct.209 The examination of special gear could be 
attributed to surveyors of classification societies. Additionally, they could be significant in 
the monitoring of the introduction of new gear.210 The technical measures for the 
prevention of the incidental catch of seabirds fall in the same category. 
 
Monitoring of vessels 
 
Part of the obligation to implement monitoring, control and surveillance measures is the 
promotion of VMS.211 VMS fits into more than one of these three elements.212 For 
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instance, VMS can comprehend automatic location communicators or vessel tracking 
units.213 Law needs to require these parts to be placed on board. Governments and RFMOs 
could decide, for example, only to issue authorisations if the core condition, being the 
presence of an automatic location communicator, is met.214 The examination of the 
functioning of these systems provides an excellent opportunity for the involvement of 
classification societies. There exists a clear encouragement to implement mandatory 
reporting and VMS at the level of RFMOs.215 The significance of VMS is so extensive that 
it could arguably diminish the importance of port State control in the future.216 Then, a 
ministerial meeting emphasised this point by setting a deadline for the presence of VMS on 
all large-scale fishing vessels.217 
 
Port State measures 
 
Port State measures in relation to IUU fishing experienced a very quick development 
compared to other issues under international law. A year after the adoption of the IPOA-
IUU, plans were already made for a document bringing together IUU fishing and port State 
measures to prevent them. In 2005, a Model Scheme was published in this regard. Two 
years later, an expert consultation was convened with the task to make a draft for a legally-
binding instrument. In 2008, a technical consultation commenced and altered the draft of 
the Expert Consultation. And in the same year, 2009, a final agreement saw the light. The 
increasing importance of port States in the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU 
fishing might assist flag States to improve their performance in this area. The potential 
application of classification societies could be used in the realm of flag States but also 
extended to port State duties. Cooperation between different kinds of States is 
quintessential for the improvement of the framework in which fisheries nowadays operate.  
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Safety of fishing vessels 
 
As stated earlier, the international legal instruments concerning shipping are hardly 
applicable to the fishing industry.218 Therefore, the IMO developed an international 
convention for the safety of fishing vessels. Classification societies are clearly involved in 
this field. States, for instance, have to publish a list with non-governmental organisations 
to which they attributed power relating to construction, design and equipment.219 A very 
extensive and detailed annex to the Convention lists the requirements concerning these 
topics.220 The contracting parties needed a protocol to update the convention within two 
decades.221 This protocol specifies, among other things, more about the certification of 
fishing vessels where classification societies might become involved again but has not 
entered into force yet.222 
 
5.4  Potential legal developments regarding classification societies 
 
Considering the above, the potential application of classification societies fits legally into 
many already existing provisions and guidelines. However, none of the existing law on 
fisheries mentions explicitly the role of classification societies. One gap that is necessary 
to bridge is that classification societies currently examine vessels and not flag States as a 
whole. Consequently, a legal framework for the application of classification societies 
needs to be developed. The similar process within the IMO could serve as an example in 
this regard. The FAO could pick up this idea within the scope of its work on improving 
flag State performance. As far as IUU fishing is concerned, the General Assembly already 
encourages  
 
strengthened collaboration between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and the International Maritime Organization, taking into account 
the respective competencies, mandates and experience of the two organizations, to 
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combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, particularly in improving the 
implementation of flag State responsibilities and port State measures.223 
 
Here, the General Assembly once again underscores the complementary function of flag 
State responsibilities and port State measures. The General Assembly further stresses that, 
apart from the FAO, also RFMOs are competent “to develop guidelines on flag State 
control of fishing vessels”.224 
Quintessential for the work of classification societies is that every “State shall 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag.”225 Further detail points out that this jurisdiction and 
control comprehends construction, equipment and seaworthiness of vessels and their use of 
signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions.226 In order to 
comply with these duties, it is necessary “that each ship, before registration and thereafter 
at appropriate intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on board such 
charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and instruments as are appropriate 
for the safe navigation of the ship”.227 This provision lays down the work for classification 
societies clearly; the first half mentions its employees and the second part sums up the 
objects that should be examined. Other States are permitted to bring deficiencies of vessel 
to the attention of the flag State.228 
 
5.5 Flag State performance assessment 
 
So far, classification societies could assist flag States in keeping their fleet in compliance 
with international requirements. There is, however, a difference between assessing the 
performance of individual vessels and assessing the performance of a State in its capacity 
as a flag State.229 When “the ultimate objective of assessing flag State performance must 
be to identify situations where a flag State has breached its international obligations by 
failing to meet the criteria required of a responsible flag State”, the potential role of 
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classification societies becomes much more doubtful.230 With such an objective, the focus 
is more on enforcement and international responsibility of States. For reasons outlined 
above, classification societies are currently less suitable for a role as international guardian 
of international fisheries law on a regional or global level.  
Nevertheless, there might exist some opportunities in this direction. In order to 
elaborate on these options, the different kinds of assessment need to be kept in mind. First, 
self-assessment of flag State performance could be perfectly possible when resources are 
abundant. Classification societies could also assist in such an assessment, especially with 
regard to technical requirements, but a State that assesses its own performance would 
certainly not guarantee an objective outcome. Second, the same is true for unilateral 
assessment, which involves one State assesses the performance of another.231 
The third option has probably the largest potential because many States could 
potentially be involved in the assessment or a group of States organises such assessment 
through an RFMO. Multilateral assessment through RFMOs is already practiced in some 
parts of the world but the focus is on assessment of the whole organisation than on the 
individual member States.232 A discussion during the expert consultation at FAO in the 
summer of 2009 showed a positive attitude towards the possibilities for RFMOs to be 
engaged in enhancing flag State performance and fight IUU fishing especially.233 The 
General Assembly of the UN consequently urges such a development as well.234 
Guidelines for RFMOs concerning the assessment of flag State performance are overtly 
based on the above discussed international legal instruments.235 
As the next logical step, a technical consultation followed the expert consultation. 
Many States turned out to be sceptical about third-party assessment of their flag State 
performance and sanctions. Furthermore, some raised the suggestion that guidelines for 
responsible flag States should only be applicable to the high seas. The chairperson did not 
officially close the technical consultation in May 2011 to leave room for a second session 
whenever funding is available. In the meantime, the chairperson wrote a report covering 
the discussion so far.236 The accompanying draft criteria for flag State performance define 
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broad objectives and some requirements on national vessel registry and authorisations. All 
these criteria are largely based on the already existing rules and encouragements contained 
in the international legal instruments above and the criteria that were developed during the 
expert consultation.237 One regional example where classification societies assist in flag 
State enforcement occurs in Europe. The EU provides its member States with the 
opportunity to delegate their authority partly to recognised organisations. Such a 
delegation should be strictly regulated.238 The scope of this delegation lies within those 
IMO instruments that are mandatory for EU member States.239 There is no special 
mentioning of fishing vessels but the EU Flag State Code could be applicable to this part 
of the fleet. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
In even stronger language than in the 2008 Report of the Secretary General on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea that is quoted in the first chapter, one could state that a shift away from 
exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas concerning fisheries is crystal clear. The 
international legal instruments that are discussed above constitute only the top of the 
iceberg on ideas and drafts in this field. Port States, coastal States, States of origin with 
regard to anadromous species, and even market States gain unmistakably more jurisdiction 
compared to flag States. One cannot conclude, though, that there is a strict divide between 
flag State performance on the one hand and other unilateral or multilateral forms of control 
on the other hand. The international community could use both elements complementary.  
The Secretary-General of the UN once again points out that it is highly necessary 
that changes take place. 
 
The need to enhance effective implementation and enforcement of the international 
legal and policy instruments relating to oceans and the seas continues to be a 
challenge for the international community. Although lack of capacity and technical 
knowledge contribute to that issue, insufficient political will and lack of long-term, 
integrated planning also play a role.240 
 
As was seen, there are areas - either legally or geographically - where it is close to 
impossible for flag States to make their fleet comply with the rules. The huge 
environmental risks of over-fishing, IUU fishing and harmful fishing techniques should not 
be underestimated. Additionally, in discussing the international law on fisheries, a 
distinction has to be made in hard law, soft law and customary law. There is always the 
common difficulty with international legal instruments that not all relevant States are party 
to that particular instrument. In case of high seas fisheries, this problem is even worse 
because a flag State has no incentive to unilaterally comply with the rules if this results in 
the fact that others will catch the fish it does not catch.241 Judge Paik of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea draw in this regard the general conclusions that further 
‘qualifications to the freedom of high seas fishing and the exclusivity of flag State 
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jurisdiction’ are needed.242 He sees a broadening of ‘the mandate of RFMOs and 
strengthening their roles and functions’ as an evident next step.243 In sum, the shift to a 
multilateral responsibility for high seas fisheries by way of RFMOs is very much 
welcomed but there is still a long way to go and much more effort is needed.  
To come to an assessment of the possibilities for involvement of classification 
societies in worldwide fisheries, one has to be both positive and creative. Above, a concise 
overview is given of the possibilities and limitations. A probably even better summarising 
statement is made in one of the early elaborations on port State control in fisheries: 
 
Naturally, it will be impossible to observe fishing and processing operations during 
an inspection in port, but it should nevertheless be possible to reconstruct the 
fishing activities of the vessel. In addition to formalities such as identification etc, a 
port inspector should be able to determine the fishing pattern, catches, and verify 
the fish on board through an inspection. It should also be possible to check the hold 
and construction of the fishing gear. Even if not landed, information about the fish 
on board the vessel may in some cases also be determined as precisely as 
desired.244 
 
Noticeably, no mention is made of classification societies. Nevertheless, if one bears in 
mind that those societies could carry out port State control, the connection is clear. This 
quote also eloquently explains that, though the classification system developed to execute 
static checks, reconstructing the activity – fishing itself – is very well possible. 
First of all, the legal status of the ship and the relevant official documents can be 
investigated. The widespread practice of reflagging vessels could be addressed through this 
channel. The Registration Convention provides a good starting point here. The fact that 
flag States shall ensure that their vessels “are periodically surveyed by its authorized 
surveyors in order to ensure compliance with applicable international rules and standards” 
could be used as a model for a new instrument concerning fisheries.245 Consequently, the 
Registration Convention sums up many data and documents that are eligible for 
examination by these surveyors. Second, however, the classification system started out to 
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assess the technical condition of a ship. Regarding fishing vessels, these checks could be 
carried out within the scope of observer programmes of States or RFMOs. Points of 
attention might be the legality of the fishing gear on board, excessive capacity, the marking 
of vessels and gear, the functioning of VMS and insurance issues. Especially the 
examination of gear has to do with the control of bycatch as well. In sum, classification 
societies will operate in the field of what is known as monitoring, control and surveillance. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that classification societies would not fulfil the job of a 
police officer. So, there is only a pre-assessment and post-assessment of the fishing 
activity. This conclusion directs back to remark concerning static and dynamic assessment.  
The above relates to the potential tasks to fulfil by classification societies when a 
government will hire them. A function that comes even closer to exercising a public task is 
the issuing of authorisations and licences. The size and catch capacity of the ship are key 
points in this regard.246 Experts already concluded that non-governmental organisations – 
as which classification societies are categorised - could be used for these purposes.247 
Important here is to keep track of the international developments regarding the topic as 
well. As elaborated upon above, registration of vessels is a prerequisite for any action. 
Notwithstanding this significance, the registration itself also creates problems related to the 
required genuine link between the vessel and the flag State. A global overview of 
registered fishing vessels is under development and will potentially solve some of the 
problems relating to the unclear processes of changes in name, ownership and nationality 
of ships.248 A role for classification societies is imaginable. 
 In order to develop a framework for the functioning of classification societies, the 
drafters might look in the direction of the IMO where a code for recognised organisations 
is near completion. Such a process would also bridge the gap between the examination of a 
vessels and the assessment of flag States. On the one hand, it cannot be emphasised enough 
that the scope in which classification societies can operate is limited. Classification “means 
assessing, evaluating, and estimating a ships’ reliability and the financial risks it 
presents.”249 On the other hand, these tasks are essential in the maintenance of safety of 
fishing vessels. Updating the Code of Conduct or integrating a legal framework for the 
                                                        
246 See FAO (2008) note 163 supra, p. 7, FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 25 and IPOA-IUU, Artt. 44-50. 
247 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 33. 
248 FAO, ‘Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels’ in FAO 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Department [online] cited 6 April 2011 http://www.fao.org/fishery/global-
record/en. 
249 See Boisson (1994) note 112 supra, p. 377. 
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involvement of classification societies in the world of fisheries in another or new 
instrument might be necessary.250 Ideas on the improvement of flag State performance 
already demonstrate windows of opportunity for the potential application of classification 
societies, without mentioning the latter specifically though.251 This omission of a direct 
link to classification societies is the case for all the major international legal instruments 
concerning fisheries. Nevertheless, the application in global fisheries of this new entity 
with centuries of experience might be of indispensable importance in order to improve flag 
State performance.252 
                                                        
250 Code of Conduct, Art. 4.3. 
251 See FAO (2009) note 84 supra, p. 25. 
252 For the author of this thesis the following persons were of indispensable importance in order to finish the 
job. My sincere thanks to Lief Bleyen, Eve de Coning, Judith Swan, Sigrid Wettwer, David Doulman, Jan 
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1979, entered into force 1 November 1983) 1651 UNTS 355. 
 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (adopted 26 January 1982, in effect 
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